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SOME PROBLEMS CONFRONTING COUNSEL IN DEFENSE OF AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE CASES
BERT BEASLEY*

The topic under consideration is concerned with the art
or practice side of the lawyer's endeavors. It involves a
study of the behavior of judges, jurors and of other lawyers
with whom our daily work requires us to deal, as well as a
consideration of more or less definite principles of law applied to the varying circumstances encountered in the trial of
civil causes of action. Trial tactics, like strategy in other pursuits, in the final analysis, depends very largely upon the application of common sense to a given situation.

I
Problems Relating to Information Reaching the Jury
Implying Insurance Coverage
"It is the aim of the law to afford litigants an impartial
tribunal and a fair trial."
Vega v. Evans (Ohio), 191 N.E. 757.
Another court in discussing some phases of the problem
under consideration declares:
"One of the most manifest and pressing duties, not only
of courts, but of lawyers, is to prevent influences of this kind,"
-evidence that the defendant carries liability insurance"from finding their way into the administration of justice.
In the discharge of this duty the entire commonwealth is
deeply concerned, for the use in evidence and argument of
such influences produces injustice and waste of the time and
labor of courts and juries at great public cost."
Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 75 S. E. 533.
1. Whether Defense Counsel Should Admit Insurance
Coverage.
One of the earliest problems to be encountered, and one
of great importance in conducting a trial is whether defense
address by the Honorable Bert Beasley of the Marion County
Bar at the Legal Institute sponsored by the Indiana State Bar
Assoeiation at the Claypool Hotel, Indianapolis, Indiana, on January 24, 1941.
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counsel at the outset of the trial should admit in the presence
of the jury that the defendant carried liability insurance.
Experienced trial lawyers are not agreed upon any definite
course to be pursued as a general rule. A recent survey conducted among Indiana defense lawyers on the question, develops three different theories: one class of lawyers says it
always tell the jury at the earliest opportunity that there is
an insurance carrier involved; another class advises that it
should never be known to the jury, if possible to prevent it;
and a third group takes the view that the circumstances of
each particular case should determine the procedure.
Some insurance carriers in some sections of the country
give broad and general instructions to their defense counsel
to admit at the outset of the trial that an insurance carrier
is conducting the trial of the case.
The judge of one of the courts of Marion County recently stated that from his observance and experience, juries
drawn from Marion County, sitting in his court, were greatly
influenced by information showing or implying that the
defendant carried a policy of liability insurance. He recalled
that a certain case had been tried recently in which in the
earlier stages of the trial there had not been any reference
to insurance. It seemed likely that there would be no recovery, but upon a somewhat incidental reference to insurance, the aspect of the case changed very materially and the
jury returned a verdict for a substantial amount. It is the
positive view of this judge that reference to insurance almost
invariably assures the return of a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.
Even though it may be a fact from common knowledge
that indemnity insurance is now very generally carried by
persons owning and operating automobiles, nevertheless the
conclusion does not necessarily follow that every jury will
disregard all harmful inferences in that respect.
It must, therefore, be conceded that there is difficulty in
reaching any definite rule to be followed invariably, because
of the impossibility of evaluating the unappreciated (and perhaps unconscious) influence of prejudicial matter on the
mind of the jury.
2. Misconduct of Counsel
Misconduct of counsel may arise in the voir dire ex-
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amination of the jurors, admission of improper evidence, or
in the argument or statements of counsel in the presence of
the jury. The improper attempt to impress the jury with
the fact that the defendant carries some form of insurance
protection, has given rise to a practice that is frequently very
seriously abused; and presents problems that are appropriate
for the consideration of this Indiana State Bar Association.
(a)

Voir Dire Examination of Jurors

It is the general rule in the majority of courts that, so
long as counsel acts in good faith, for the purpose of ascertaining the qualifications of jurors, and not for the purpose of informing them that an insurance company is back of
the defendant, he has the right to interrogate prospective
jurors with respect to their interest in or possible connection
with indemnity insurance companies.
But even where it is considered proper to bring in reference to an insurance carrier, counsel ought not to transcend
proper limitations in making an examination of the jury.
If his principal purpose is to get before the jury the fact
that the defendant is insured, and this is evidenced by persistent, improper conduct, a reversal of the case is required
if there is a verdict for plaintiff upon a proper presentation
of the question on appeal.
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139.
Counsel sometimes employ various methods improperly
to project insurance into the foreground. In a leading case in
Indiana during the examination of the jurors, counsel for the
plaintiff offered to put the defendant himself on the witness
stand and to show that he had indemnity insurance on his
automobile in the sum of $5,000.00 They also offered to
prove that defandant's counsel were not employed by the defendant, but were employed by an insurance company, and
further offered to have one of the defendant's counsel sworn
and put on the witness stand to testify on that subject. All
of this was done over the objection of appellant's counsel,
and in spite of their request to the court that such offers
be not made in the presence of the jury.
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139.
It is an easy matter during examination of jurors to
plant in their minds prejudicial matter. As stated in one of
our Indiana Appellate Court decisions:
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" * * * This can be done very adroitly or very crudely,
depending upon the personality of the examiner. * * *"
Marmon Motor Car Co.. v. Schafer, 93 Ind. App. 588, 590.
By singling out a particular insurance company, rather
that qualifying the jurors by asking whether they are interested in or connected with any corporation, or even with any
insurance company, plaintiff's counsel is likely to lead the
jury to draw the inference that the defendant is insured
by a designated insurance company.
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139;
Evansville Gas Co. v. Robertson, 55 Ind. App. 353.
A proper method of examination of prospective jurors
is a comparatively easy matter. In a leading case in Indiana
the court says:
"* * * Usually in these inquiries counsel are careful not
to disclose their purpose. If they were as careful in cases
where there is an indemnity insurance contract, they could
find out whether any juror was interested either directly
or indirectly in any indemnity company without disclosing
to the jury that such company has an interest in the litigation.
•

*,,

Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139, 145 (6).
The Appellate Court has stated the proper course of
procedure in the following language:
"The object of examination on the voir dire is to disclose
to the examiner what the prospective juror thinks, does, or is,
and his reaction to certain matters. The object of such an
examination is not to plant in the juror's mind prejudicial
matter. * * *"
Marmon Motor Car Co., v. Schafer, 93 Ind. App. 588, 590.
(b)

Admission of Incompetent Evidence

Subject to well-known proper exceptions and qualifications, evidence that the defendant in an action to recover for
personal injuries carries liability insurance protecting him
from liability to third persons on account of his own negligence is not admissable.
Taggart v. Keebler, 198 Ind. 633.
Such evidence is inadmissable because it is irrelevant;
the fact that the defendant carries liability insurance is not
relevant to the question of his liability. Testimony of this
character is extremely prejudicial, for it suggests to the
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jurors that the insurance company is the real defendant and
will have to pay the judgment. Ordinarily the only purpose
in introducing such evidence can be to impress that fact on
the minds of the jury, with the view of inciting prejudice
against the defendant.
Such evidence has the manifest and strong tendency to
carry the jury away from the real issue, and to lead them
to regard carelessly the legal rights of the defendant, on the
ground that someone else will have to pay the verdict. No
circumstance is more surely calculated to cause a jury to
return a verdict against a defendant, without regard to the
sufficiency of the evidence, than proof that the person against
whom such verdict is sought is amply protected by insurance.
(c)

Argument or Statements of Counsel

Arguments and statements of counsel may be prejudicial
and harmful for the reason that they refer to matters not
shown in evidence or for the reason that the argument or
statements are appeals to sympathy, passion or prejudice of
the jurors.
In one reported decision counsel stated in argument that
the suit was for only $5,000.00, "for reasons which we are
not permitted to explain, and we do not even want a button
off defendant's vest." This statement was held prejudicial
as injecting the false issue of insurance in the case.
Ingerick v. Mess, 63 Fed. (2d) 233.
In a certain comparatively recent case in Indiana, it appears that while counsel for plaintiff was examining a witness, a question was asked concerning an "insurance plate";
and that counsel for defendant at once interposed an objection to the question, and then, addressing the court, said:
"What has that to do with this case?" Whereupon the attorney for plaintiff said, addressing opposing counsel, in the
presence and hearing of the jury:
"You know what it has to do with it. You know who
employed you to defend this case."
The Appellate Court in its opinion passing on that case
uses this language:
"These remarks were highly improper; they were entirely uncalled for; they could only tend to bring reproach
upon the members of the bar, and discredit upon the in-
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dividual member thereof, who would be so far forgetful of his
high calling, as a sworn officer of the court, whose highest
aim should be 'to assist in the due administration of justice'
as to indulge in such so-called sharp practice. Such conduct
always merits a severe rebuke by the trial court. * * *"
Norris v. West, 78 Ind. App. 391, 394 (3-4).
In a recent decision by the Appellate Court the attorney
for plaintiff made the following statement to the jury during
his argument:
"I don't see how they (referring to appellant's attorneys)
are paid, whether by per cent on the amount they save the
defendant or by his insurance company." Counsel further
stated to the jury during the argument that "they (appellant's
attorneys) are very solicitious about the dollars of the defendant or his insurance company."
Flamion v. Dawes, 91 Ind. App. 394, 399 (4).
Such statements by counsel can not be justified as legitimate argument.
Frequently the misconduct of counsel in argument consists of appeal to sympathy, passion and prejudice.
"Arguments and comments by counsel calculated to
arouse the passions and prejudices of a jury by presenting
to them considerations extraneous to the evidence are highly
improper."y
64 C. J., page 276, Sec. 294.
3.

What Constitutes PrejudicialError

The question of what constitutes prejudicial error presents difficulties with which every trial lawyer is familiar.
The statement of general rules concerning prejudice may not
be difficult; but their practical application many times is the
source of great difficulty. Many courts have taken th6 position
that the prejudicial effect of an attempt improperly to inject
into the trial of a case, by evidence, statements, or arguments,
matters from which the jury might infer that the defendant
was insured against liability constitutes prejudicial error.
Evidence that the defendant is insured or that the defense is
being conducted by an insurance company, is not only incompetent, but so dangerous and prejudicial as to require a
reversal.
Taggart v. Keebler, 198 Ind. 633.
In determining what constitutes prejudicial error, an
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important consideration is: Was the misconduct calculated
improperly to influence or prejudice the jury against the defendant?
In the case of the examination of the jurors on their
voir dire, the Indiana courts have frequently suggested the
good faith of counsel as the proper test to be applied. In
one of the decisions by the Supreme Court of Indiana the
court says:
"* * * Many questions may be asked and considerable
latitude may be and should be allowed to enable a party to a
law suit to find out whether a juror has any interest, business associations, social opinions, preconceived notions, experiences or prejudices that will affect him as a juror in the
particular case. Usually in these inquiries counsel are careful not to disclose their purpose. If they were as careful
in cases where there is an indemnity insurance contract,
they could find out whether any juror was interested either
directly or indirectly in any indemnity company without disclosing to the jurors that such company has an interest in the
litigation. Good faith marks the boundary line. * * *"
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139, 145.
Bad faith on the part of counsel in the examination of
jurors may appear by persistence in asking improper questions of the prospective jurors, or by repeated efforts of
plaintiff's counsel by argument or remarks to get before the
jury the fact that an insurance company is defending the
case. The phrase, "persistent efforts," is not to be limited in
its meaning to repeated efforts; the substance of the rule
is that the plaintiff in damage suits shall not, with intent
to influence the judgment of the jury, convey a suspicion
or surmise by direction or indirection that the defendant
holds a policy of insurance which will protect him from
loss in case a verdict is rendered against him.
Another mark of prejudicial error is the fact that the
question, or statement of counsel was intended and tended
to prejudice the jury against the defendant. In a certain
decision by the Supreme Court of this state it was held
that an objection to a question propounded to prospective
juror on the ground "that it was intended and tended to
prejudice the jurors" was a valid objection and should have
been sustained by the lower court.
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139.
An earlier decision of the Supreme Court in passing on

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

improper argument which was intended to prejudice the
minds of the jury, says in condemnation of the misconduct of
counsel:
"The declarations were improper and well calculated to
produce the 'intended' prejudice against the defendant and
its cause of defense."
School Town v. Shaw, 100 Ind. 268, 272.
The prejudicial effect of persistent efforts to get before
a jury the fact that defendant carried liability insurance has
been discussed in a very recent case by the Appellate Court of
Indiana. The court in its opinion says:
"'* * * One can not read the record in this case without
noting the repeated efforts to get evidence before the jury
of the fact that appellant carried insurance against injury
to its customers. That question was not an issue in the case.
Whether or not such insurance was carried by the appellant
could not in the slightest manner effect the question of appellant's negligence charged in the complaint. Persistent efforts in this field of evidence which tend only to confuse and
possibly prejudice the jury are usually regarded as prejudicial,
requiring a reversal."
J. C. Penney, Inc. v. Kellermeyer, 19 N. E. (2d) 882, 886.
Where misconduct consists of statements outside the record intended and which tended to prejudice the jury, there
is a presumption that such misconduct constitutes prejudicial
error.
Nelson v. Welch, 115 Ind. 270.
And the burden is on the person guilty of misconduct to
show that the contending party was not injured.
Perry Stone Co. v. Wilson, 160 Ind. 435, 440.
(a)

Is Such Error Curable by Instructions?

Assuming there has been prejudicial misconduct, the
question arises, what is the procedure to accomplish a substantial curative effect? There are instances, so some of
the courts hold, where the sustaining of an objection removes some of the harm. Many courts hold that whether
the court should go further than that is a matter within its
discretion. However, it will appear upon careful analysis,
that there are cases where mere instructions or admonition
will not remove the harm. The following statement taken
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from 64 Corpus Juris, p. 295, Sec, 312, is a concise statement of the proposition:
"The misconduct of counsel may be such that its effect
cannot be overcome, and conduct so prejudicial that the verdict of the jury must have been influenced thereby is not
cured by an admonition to the jury."
An early decision in Indiana passes on the question in
a case in which the bill of exceptions showed that during the
closing argument to the jury counsel for the plaintiff used
language which was not within the issues, was wholly foreign and irrelevant, and which was intended to prejudice the
minds of the jury against the cause of the defendant and
which language was wholly unbecoming. The court in its
opinion says:
" * * * We think that it is shown that plaintif's counsel
was guilty of misconduct in the trial of the cause; and when
he persisted in making such remarks after objection from
opposing counsel, and being warned by the court to desist,
he was guilty of gross misconduct. * * *
"The attempt of the court afterwards, in its instructions, to remove all erroneous impressions that may have
been created upon the minds of the jury by such declarations by plaintiff's attorney, came too late; whatever impressions may have been made by such declarations already had
a lodgement in the minds of the jury, and we cannot say
that if made they would be entirely removed by instructions
from the court. The declarations were improper and were
calculated to produce the 'intended' prejudice against the
defendant and its cause of defense."
School Town of Rochester v. Shaw,
100 Ind. 268, 272 (1884).
In a more recent Indiana decision, the Supreme Court
had before it a case in which evidence repeatedly had been
admitted by witnesses who stated that the defendant had
said, "I am heavily insured."
The trial court in that case gave an instruction attempting to limit the application of the evidence. The opinion of
the Supreme Court then goes on to say:
"Instead of curing the error in admitting evidence that
the defendant had said he was heavily insured, this instruction aggravated whatever damage had been done to defendant's case by the admission of that evidence. * * * "
Taggart v. Keebler, 198 Ind. 633, 638.
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The Supreme Court of Indiana in another decision of
comparatively recent date had this precise question before
it. The question arose on alleged error in interrogating the
jurors on their voir dire examination, and upon the offer to
put the defendant on the stand to show that he had indemnity insurance on his automobile and that counsel appearing
for him were not employed by the defendant but by an insurance company. The court in that case says:
"It is insisted in the instant case that this error of misconduct was cured by an instruction. It is true that erroneous and extraneous matters sometimes get into a law suit
through the zeal of counsel, and, if checked at once by the
trial court and the jury is instructed, this may be cured;
but one party may not be permitted to get the other into a
dying condition and then expect the court to revive him by
instructions.
"The misconduct of counsel was not cured by instructions
in this case."
Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139, 146.
4. Method of Saving Record for Preservation of Error
on Appeal
(a) Necessity for Objection
Whenever misconduct occurs, as when plaintiff's counsel makes statements outside the record or makes improper
appeals to sympathy, passion or prejudice of the jury or
otherwise transgresses proper decorum, a question of policy
immediately arises whether an objection should be made to
such misconduct.
Some courts readily recognize the difficulties under
which defense counsel labor in such circumstances. In a
recent case in a District Court of the United States, plaintiff's
counsel in final argument stated to the jury: "They (the
defendant and its counsel) haven't a defense in the world except that they have spent a lot of money for experts to try
to humbug you." And then in another part of his argument,
counsel said: "Gentlemen, just imagine these doctors standing at the autopsy, why they stood there like a bunch of
sharks ready to seize on -.

"

When the case reached the

Circuit Court of Appeals some question was raised as to the
sufficiency of the record to present the question of misconduct. The court said:
"It is clear, that, if possible, there should be some prac-
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tical rule with respect to saving exceptions to improper remarks of counsel made in argument to a jury. * * * The
Appellate Courts are not bound to recognize as exclusive the
rule that counsel may only object and except at the time the
improper argument is in progress, and are free to adopt any
rule which is fair to litigants, fair to their counsel and fair
to the trial judge. * * * The party who has been injured by
an improper argument ought not to be precluded from securing a review, where his counsel has failed to interrupt the
argument of opposing counsel, believing it would injure his
client's case to do so. * * * To interrupt the argument of
opposing counsel is often a hazardous thing to do. It may
create more prejudice than it removes. It leads to controversies between counsel, which interfere with the orderly
conduct of the trial. Jurors do not ordinarily know the difference between proper and improper argument. They easily
obtain the impression that objecting counsel is unfair and
is trying to keep them from hearing something of consequence.•* * "

London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle,
83 Fed. (2d) 325, 343.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
misconduct of counsel may be of such flagrant character
the trial court of its own motion should have intervened,
aid failing to do so, the court on appeal will grant appropriate
relief, notwithstanding the absence of objection or exception.
In that particular case there had been misconduct during
the closing argument to the jury. The court says:
"Respondents urge that the objections were not sufficiently specific to justify a reversal. But a trial in court
is never, as respondents in their brief argue this one was,
'purely a private controversy * * * of no importance to the
public.' The state, whose interest it is the duty of the court
and counsel alike to uphold, is concerned that every litigation
be fairly and impartially conducted and that verdicts of juries
be rendered only on the issues made by the pleadings and
the evidence. The public interest requires that the court of
its own motion, as is its power and duty, protect suitors in
their right to a verdict uninfluenced by the appeals of counsel
to passion or prejudice. * * * Where such paramount considerations are involved, the failure of counsel to particularize
an exception will not preclude this court from correcting the
error."
New York Central R. Co. v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 310, 318, 73 L. Ed. 706, 710.
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(b) The Rule in Indiana
The rule in Indiana requires an appropriate objection
or motion. The court must be asked to take some specific
action upon objection or motion. Under the rules recently
adopted by the Supreme Court of Indiana, the record need
not show exceptions to adverse actions, orders or rulings of
the Court. If counsel believes the injury is of such character that it can not be repaired by instruction or admonition,
he should move the court to set aside the submission of the
cause and to discharge the jury.
Counsel, in the exercise of prudent caution, will examine the authorities as preparation for the task for saving
the record. Where the error occurs during the examination
of prospective jurors on their voir dire, there must be an
approrpiate objection or motion. There must be a special
bill of exceptions, and it is deemed the safer practice in most
instances to bring the entire examination of the jury, the
objections, motions, and rulings into the record.1 A copy of
such bill of exceptions will be included in the record on appeal.
Mitchell v. Beissenherz, (1922),
192 Ind. 587, 591;
Rhodes v. State, (1930), 202 Ind.
159.
The motion for new trial must present the question and
allege misconduct on the part of counsel or allege irregularity
in the proceedings. Where there has been improper statements or arguments of counsel the record must show the
objection or motion of the objecting party. Where the harm
is deemed to be irreparable there should be a motion to set
aside the submission of the cause and discharge the panel,
with appropriate showing in a special bill of exceptions, copy
of which is to be made part of the record on appeal.
Where steps are to be taken for a mistrial on account
'When evidence is conflicting as to the competency of a juror, the
entire examination of the juror and all the evidence on the subject,
must be brought into the record by a bill of exceptions.
Townsend v. State (1897), 147 Ind. 624, 636;
Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Pitzer (1897), 109 Ind. 179, 189;
Douthitt v. State (1896), 144 Ind. 897.
Unless the record contains the entire voir dire examination of the
jurors, the action of the trial court, in some instances, will not be reviewed.
Annadoll v. Union Cement, etc. Co. (1908), 42 Ind. App. 264, 266;
Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works (1909), 43 Ind. App. 643, 644, 645;
Johnson v. Holliday (1881), 79 Ind. 151, 155.
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of misconduct of counsel, the Appellate Court in a recent
opinion has stated:
"The rule of procedure and steps necessary to be taken
by a litigant who is aggrieved by the misconduct of opposing
counsel, were properly stated in the case of Ramseyer, Exr.
v. Dennis, (1918), 187 Ind. 420, 439 (23)."
See Pennsylvania Ice & Coal Co. v.
Elischer, 106 Ind. App. 613, 618.
Some additional authorities to consult are:
Maybin v. Webster, 8 Ind. App. 547,
552;
United States Cement Co. v. Cooper,
172 Ind. 599, 614;
Vandalia Coal Co. v. Price, 178 Ind.
546, 557;
Taggart v. Keebler, 198 Ind. 633, 640;
Annadall v. Union Cement Co., 42 Ind.
App. 264;
Inland Steel Co. v. Gillespie, 181 Ind.
633, 645;
J. C. Penney, Inc. v. Kellermeyer, 19
N.E. (2d) 882, 886.
It may be suggested that a mistrial should not be allowed
because of the delay thereby resulting in the litigation.
Courts have expressed very definite views concerning this
subject:
" * * * When counsel so far forget themselves, and the
dignity of their profession as to travel outside of the evidence
and the record in the case, in argument to the jury, and wantonly and virulently attack the character of the opposing
party and witnesses, attempt to browbeat opposing counsel,
and disregard the orders of the court, they ought not to complain if a new trial be granted on account of their misconduct. * ** "
School Town v. Shaw, 100 Ind. 268,273.
The Supreme Court of one of our Central States has said:
i * * * We regret that clients must suffer for the overzealousness of counsel, but if the courts are to retain the
respect of the people they must restrain counsel from going
beyond the limits of fair argument. In a democracy like ours
the impartial administration of justice is essential to the
preservation of liberty. * * * Too often if justice is not
thought to be impartial foul means are resorted to. Hence
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it is vital to our welfare that general respect for the fairness
of juries as well as of judges be maintained. * * * "
Krenik v. Westerman, (Minn.), (1937),
275 N.W. 849, 851.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, through Sanborn, Circuit
Judge, says:
" * * * The truth is that when a lawyer departs from
the path of legitimate argument, he does so at his own peril
and that of his client, and if his argument is both improper
and prejudicial, then he has destroyed any favorable verdict
that his client may obtain, unless, in some way, his error has
been cured prior to the submission of the case to the jury."
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v.
Woelfle, (1936), 83 Fed. (2d) 326, 343.
Suggested Remedial Procedure
Courts frankly recognize the existence of an evil growing out of misconduct of counsel which results in prejudicial
harm. They are not always in accord as to the procedure
to be followed or the discipline to be administered. In a
reported decision from the Supreme Court of one of the
Central States it appears that during the course of the trial
plaintiff's counsel was guilty of the following misconduct:
He asked one of the plaintiff's witnesses whether late at
night any of the tribe of detectives of the Street Car Company happned out to take her statement. One of the physicians called by defendant's counsel, on cross-examination, testified that he worked for compensation insurance companies
and thereupon plaintiff's counsel made the statement:
5.

"You are paid by the people who are interested in having
the person painted with iodine and marked for duty and sent
back ?"

And to another physician he remarked in the presence
of the jury:
"So you have now joined the ranks of the elite."
The court in passing upon the error assigned says:
I * * * We consider that we can not properly pass the
matter with mere criticism, as this court has often passed
like matters in the past. The court should not only say
something about it, but should do something about it. All
that has heretofore been said in condemnation and admoni-
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tion has had little, if any, effect towards stopping such misconduct."
Hanley v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. Co.
(Wis.), (1935), 263 N.W. 638.
On the voir dire examination of jurors it has been suggested that the trial judge himself make the appropriate
inquiry of the prospective jurors as to whether they are
stockholders, officers, agents or employees of any insurance
company.
In the decision of a certain case in Ohio the court says:
"If counsel for plaintiff, acting in good faith, is led to
a belief or even a serious apprehension that there may be
such a conflicting interest in some prospective juror, or jurors,
there is a way for him to protect his client's interest without
prejudicing the interests of defendant. * * * Counsel might
very well state his apprehension to the presiding judge and
ask the judge to conduct the examination of the jurors on
their voir dire. The judge upon proper showing of cause,
could conduct examination of the jurors on this point after
first stating that he has no knowledge whether or not the
defendant is insured, and that they must assume that he is
not insured. Or if the counsel conduct the examination, he
should * * * do it by questions of a general and impartial
nature *
* without the prejudicial suggestion that an insurance company is involved in the case, and such questioning
must not go beyond the extent necessary to insure a fair
and impartial jury in view of the circumstances of the case
and the parties to the litigation."
Vega v. Evans, 191 N.E. 757.
The view taken by the Ohio courts has been expressed
in a recent decision in the following language:
"A sound public economy and the administration of
justice requires a strict adherence to the issues between the
primary parties without regard to the existence of any indemnity contrart. *: The injection of the insurance company into the case by innuendo creates the assumption on the
part of the jurors that the insurance company has been paid
to indemnify the injured plaintiff for the loss, and that it is
attempting to escape such liability. * * * The parties involved in the action for damages should be the same as the
parties involved in the accident or injury. And a sound public
policy requires the determination of the question of liability
by reference to the issues between such parties only, without
reference to their contracts with others."
Vega v. Evans, 191 N.E. 757.
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In a recent decision by the Appellate Court, counsel during his argument to the jury, made the statement:
"The defendant is just like the plaintiff. He does not
care if a judgment is rendered against him. He won't have
to pay it."
The opinion of the court on that subject contains the following language:
"The making of improper statements by counsel in their
arguments to juries can not be condemned too severely. Said
statements of appellee's counsel were clearly improper, but
we must recognize the fact that the trial court was in much
better position to determine the effect of said statements,
than this court is. Trial courts have a wide field of discretion
as to motions to withdraw causes from juries because of such
misconduct of counsel. We hold that the record does not show
an abuse of such discretion here."
Coats v. Strawmeyer, (1939) 21 N.E. (2d) 433.
It is difficult to imagine a case where the jury could be
given more clearly to understand that an insurance carrier
was in the background and that the jury need not worry
about the effect of a judgment against a defendant.
In another recent case where the argument was "outside
the record" the court says:
"This court does not condone or approve remarks of
counsel in arguments to juries which are 'outside the record',
but we do not think it is reasonable to infer that the jury,
which we must assume was composed of fair-minded citizens,
was in any way influenced by such a remark after being instructed by the trial court to entirely disregard it. Therefore
if said remark was 'outside the record' it was harmless error."
Indianapolis Railways v. Boyer, 26 N.E. (2d) 63, 68.
As a practical matter, plaintiff's lawyer will examine the
authorities to see how far he can go, defendant's counsel
will examine the authorities to see what protection his client
may have, both sides looking to the decisions of the courts
to ascertain their course of conduct. So long as courts merely
criticize, counsel will feel free to indulge in misconduct and
this added to personal interest assures in practice the further
perpetration of a recognized growing evil. Whenever trial
courts promptly declare mistrials for misconduct, counsel will
then follow a discreet course and will refrain from attempting
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the perpetration of error designedly for the purpose of harming a defendant and procuring a verdict.
The courts of Indiana in many instances show too much
leniency toward misconduct of counsel in the particulars now
under consideration. The rules recognized and announced by
,our courts, if applied more frequently, would tend to reduce
misconduct to a minimum. A united effort on the part of
both Bench and Bar would have a marked tendency to demonstrate to the public that each of us is endeavoring to live
up to the ideal, expressed in one of our reported decisions, "of
his high calling as a sworn officer of the court whose highest
aim should be 'to assist in the due administration of justice.'"

